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Abstract 
Aims and Objectives. This article uses the concept of embodiment to demonstrate a 
conceptual approach to applied phenomenology. 
 
Background. Traditionally, qualitative researchers and healthcare professionals have been 
taught phenomenological methods, such as the epoché, reduction, or bracketing. These 
methods are typically construed as a way of avoiding biases so that one may attend to the 
phenomena in an open and unprejudiced way. However, it has also been argued that 
qualitative researchers and healthcare professionals can benefit from phenomenology’s well-
articulated theoretical framework, which consists of core concepts, such as selfhood, 
empathy, temporality, spatiality, affectivity, and embodiment. 
 
Design. This is a discursive article that demonstrates a conceptual approach to applied 
phenomenology. 
 
Method. To outline and explain this approach to applied phenomenology, the Discussion 
section walks the reader through four stages of phenomenology, which progress 
incrementally from the most theoretical to the most practical.  
 
Discussion. Part one introduces the philosophical concept of embodiment, which can be 
applied broadly to any human subject. Part two shows how philosophically trained 
phenomenologists use the concept of embodiment to describe general features of illness and 
disability. Part three illustrates how the phenomenological concept of embodiment can 
inform empirical qualitative studies and reflects on the challenges of integrating philosophy 
and qualitative research. Part four turns to phenomenology’s application in clinical practice 
and outlines a workshop model that guides clinicians through the process of using 
phenomenological concepts to better understand patient experience. 
 
Conclusion and Relevance to Clinical Practice. A conceptual approach to applied 
phenomenology provides a valuable alternative to traditional methodological approaches. 
Phenomenological concepts provide a foundation for better understanding patient experience 
in both qualitative health research and clinical practice, and therefore provide resources for 
enhancing patient care. 
 
Keywords: Applied Phenomenology; Embodiment; Nursing Research; Nursing Practice; 
Objectification; Patient Experience; Phenomenology; Philosophy; Qualitative Health 
Research 
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What does this paper contribute to the wider global clinical community? 
• Provides a clear, accessible introduction to how the phenomenology of embodiment 
can be applied to illness and health care, including applications in philosophy, 
qualitative health research, and clinical practice. 
 
• Introduces and elaborates a conceptual approach to applied phenomenology, which 
can facilitate interdisciplinary collaboration between philosophers, on the one hand, 
and qualitative health researchers and clinicians, on the other. 
 
• Outlines a workshop model that introduces phenomenological concepts to clinicians 
and walks them through the process of using these concepts to better understand 





Embodiment and Objectification in Illness and Health Care: 
Taking Phenomenology from Theory to Practice 
Aims and Objectives 
Many nurses and qualitative health researchers have turned to philosophical traditions to help 
them better understand patient experience. Among these traditions, none has been more 
influential than phenomenology, a philosophical study of human existence, which 
investigates both the subject of experience and the meaningful objects of experience. For the 
most part, phenomenology has been applied to health care by adapting its methods for use in 
qualitative health research and clinical practice. 
In this article, I demonstrate an alternative approach to applied phenomenology, 
which relies on phenomenology’s concepts, rather than its methods. To demonstrate this 
approach, I focus on the phenomenological concept of embodiment, which provides a 
valuable foundation for understanding a range of experiences in illness and health care. The 
article has two key aims: First, it provides a philosophical foundation and guide for better 
understanding embodied experiences in illness and health care. Second, it provides a general 
model for how any core phenomenological concept, such as temporality, selfhood, or 
affectivity, may be applied in healthcare research and clinical practice. 
Background  
The body is central to the practice of nursing and health care. Healthcare professionals learn 
to attend not only to bodily signs of physiological dysfunction, but also to embodied 
expressions of pain and discomfort, fear and anxiety, shame and embarrassment. In most 
cases, healthcare professionals cultivate their attention to the patient’s body through hands-on 
experience and daily clinical practice. But one’s ability to properly attend to the patient’s 
body can also be informed by philosophical phenomenology. How do we take resources from 
philosophical texts and turn them into useful tools for health care, including both qualitative 
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health research and clinical practice? Traditionally, qualitative researchers who use a 
phenomenological approach are taught phenomenological methods, such as the epoché, 
reduction, or bracketing (Morley, 2010). Within the qualitative literature, these methods are 
typically construed as a way of avoiding biases so that the researcher can attend to the 
phenomena in an open and unprejudiced way. Phenomenology’s clinical applications have 
received considerably less attention; but some proposals take a similar approach to qualitative 
research. Havi Carel, for instance, has proposed a workshop model that uses 
phenomenological methods, such as the reduction and thematization, to help patients 
understand and articulate their experiences of illness (Carel, 2012, p. 107). 
 In contrast to these traditional ways of applying phenomenology outside of 
philosophy, Dan Zahavi has argued that qualitative researchers and healthcare professionals 
can benefit from phenomenology’s well-articulated theoretical framework, which consists of 
core concepts, such as selfhood, empathy, temporality, spatiality, affectivity, and 
embodiment (Zahavi, 2019a, 2019b, 2020, forthcoming). This approach draws inspiration 
from phenomenology’s successful applications in psychiatry and the cognitive sciences, 
which were developed independently of phenomenology’s applications in qualitative research 
(Zahavi & Martiny, 2019). For example, one of the most well-known approaches—what 
Shaun Gallagher calls “front-loaded” phenomenology—incorporates core phenomenological 
concepts into the initial design of an empirical study (Gallagher, 1997; Gallagher & Zahavi, 
2012). With the appropriate concepts in hand, the researcher can effectively delimit the scope 
of their study by clearly identifying the phenomenon to be investigated. In the case of 
experimental cognitive science, the researcher’s aim is often to identify cognitive 
mechanisms that underpin experience. However, in principle, the same phenomenological 
concepts can delimit the scope of a qualitative study and allow the researcher to focus in on a 
particular aspect of experience. Moreover, as I argue below, the conceptual clarity borne of 
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both philosophical and qualitative applications of phenomenology can inform the 
understanding of patient experience in clinical practice. 
Design 
This is a discursive article that demonstrates a conceptual approach to applied 
phenomenology. 
Method 
I develop this conceptual approach to applied phenomenology in the Discussion section, 
which is composed of four parts. In part one, I introduce the phenomenological concept of 
embodiment as it’s been developed in the classical and contemporary philosophical literature. 
In part two, I show how philosophically trained phenomenologists have used the concept of 
embodiment to understand and articulate bodily experiences in illness and healthcare 
interactions. I argue, however, that these philosophical applications have been developed in 
fairly broad strokes—they provide insight into illness and healthcare experiences in general, 
but don’t typically provide much insight into the nuances of what it’s like to live with a 
specific illness or undergo a specific medical procedure. In part three, I show how qualitative 
health researchers can use phenomenological concepts as a foundation for their empirical 
studies of particular patient populations, focusing on a study of women who have undergone 
breast cancer surgery. In part four, I argue that clinicians may also benefit from a 
phenomenological understanding of embodiment. I outline a workshop model that I have 
used to equip clinicians with a sense of how illness and healthcare interactions shape bodily 
experience, which allows them to ask their patients more illuminating and penetrating 
questions about their embodied experiences of illness, health care, and recovery. These four 
sections incrementally progress from philosophical theory to clinical practice, starting from 
the experience of embodiment in general—how anyone would experience one’s own body—
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and moving toward the embodied experiences of particular patients in illness and healthcare 
interactions. 
Discussion 
1 Theoretical Foundations: Leib and Körper 
Before explaining how a conceptual approach to phenomenology can help healthcare 
professionals understand bodily experiences in illness and clinical encounters, I here 
introduce the phenomenological concept of embodiment, with a focus on bodily 
objectification. Most phenomenologists begin from the classic distinction between Leib and 
Körper.1 These German terms don’t have perfect English equivalents, but they’re often 
translated as the “lived body” and the “corporeal body,” respectively. How should we 
distinguish between these two senses of the body? We might say that the lived body is 
experienced from first-person perspective, whereas the corporeal body is experienced from 
the third-person perspective. We might point out that the lived body is the body that I am, 
whereas the corporeal body is the body that I have. Or, alternatively, we might say that the 
lived body is associated with subjectivity, whereas the corporeal body is associated with 
objectivity and objectification. These ways of distinguishing the lived and corporeal body 
overlap, but they’re not exactly the same (Heinämaa, forthcoming). Each way of 
characterizing the distinction highlights different elements of embodied existence. For our 
immediate purposes, however, we can put some of these subtlety different ways of drawing 
the division to the side. Our aim is to use phenomenological concepts to open up a space for 
thinking about embodied experience in illness and health care. Considering these aims, it’s 
important to keep in mind that the lived and corporeal body are two perspectives on the same 
body—a body that is always perceiving and engaging with its environment while at the same 
time a material object within this environment.  
 
1 For an extended and accessible introduction to this conceptual distinction, see (Aho & Aho, 2009 Ch. 1). 
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How does the healthy, able-bodied person experience their own body in their day to 
day life? How do I, for instance, experience my own body while walking to work, preparing a 
meal, or having a conversation? When absorbed in daily activities, my body recedes into the 
background of experience. It becomes transparent or absent. Drew Leder calls this bodily 
“dis-appearance” (Leder, 1990, p. 27). The transparent body is the medium of experience—
that which we experience through. By fading into the background, it enables and facilitates 
our experience of others and of our environment. When I sit down to type an email, I hardly 
notice the precise movements of my fingers as they dart across the keyboard, how my arms 
rest on the edge of my desk, or how I’m seated in my chair. But this lack of attentive 
awareness of my own body allows me to attend to the content of the email, the message I 
need to convey, and so on. In this situation, too much awareness of my own body would 
hinder my aim. To type a message while attending to the precise movements of my fingers on 
the keyboard would be a slow, painstaking task, akin to the experience of the child first 
learning to type. 
 But it’s also too simple to say that my body recedes from awareness and the objects 
before me come into view. How, for instance, do I experience the keyboard in this situation? 
The keyboard occupies a middle ground between my body and my object of awareness. In a 
sense, it too fades from view. As I type away, I don’t have to think about where each letter is 
on the keyboard. My fingers float from one key to the next. Even when I strike the wrong 
key, I reach for the backspace button without a second thought and continue drafting my 
message. Phenomenologists refer to this as “incorporation.” Over the course of years, I’ve 
developed an array of motor habits: tacit ways of moving my body and engaging with my 
environment. When I sit down in front of my keyboard, I settle into a well-worn path—just as 
I do when I get into my car or climb on my bike. The well-habituated body doesn’t engage 
with an unfamiliar environment of dissociated objects. It gears into a world of what 
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phenomenologists call “affordances”—objects and environments that offer various 
possibilities for action. Which possibilities they afford depend on one’s own motor skills, 
bodily capacities, and personal history. Phenomenologists refer to this mode of bodily 
experience as the “I can.” This means that we experience our environment in light of our 
current aims and projects; and it therefore shows up to us as something that frustrates or 
facilitates these aims. When I walk into the kitchen to make a meal, the knife affords the 
possibility of cutting vegetables; when I need to get to the pub in the rain, the umbrella 
affords the possibility of walking without getting wet. And these items afford these 
possibilities because I’ve developed the motor habits that allow me to seamlessly incorporate 
them into my bodily movements. 
 All of this presumes the smooth functioning of a healthy, able body. But what 
happens when this seamless integration of body and world is disrupted? Suppose that, as I’m 
typing away, my hands begin to cramp. How does my body awareness shift in this situation? 
At first, there may be no explicit shift. Without thinking, I may simply move my fingers in a 
way that’s more comfortable. But, eventually, pain bubbles to the surface of my awareness 
and my aching hands vie for my attention. My body, previously the medium of experience 
and action, becomes the primary object of my experience. Leder calls this mode of 
experience bodily “dys-appearance,” which refers to the “thematization of the body which 
accompanies dysfunction and problematic states” (Leder, 1990, p. 86). The dys-appearing 
body is precisely the body that appears in moments of pain, discomfort, and so on. 
Leder’s initial characterization focuses primarily on first-personal or individual 
experiences of bodily appearance, such as sensations of pain and physical discomfort. In 
which other circumstances might the body appear to us in a thematic or explicit way? We 
don’t just use our bodies for completing everyday tasks, such as walking to work, typing an 
email, or preparing a meal. We also engage in a variety of social practices, wherein we 
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perceive the bodies of other people neither as brute, meaningless objects, nor as instruments 
for manipulation. Rather, we perceive them as expressive of desires, intentions, and 
emotions. In the other’s gesture, I see his wariness, his confidence, or his excitement.2 
And what about my own expressive body? When I’m absorbed in conversation with a 
friend, my body disappears in the way that Leder describes. But if, for example, I realize that 
my friend keeps looking at a spot on my shirt, then I may become concerned that I’ve spilled 
something on myself without noticing. In this moment, I’m wrenched from my fluid 
engagement in the conversation. I can’t help but to take up my friend’s objectifying view and 
now see myself through his eyes. Leder refers to this as an experience of “social dys-
appearance” (Leder, 1990, p. 96). The body shows up to me in a negative way, but precisely 
in the context of a social encounter. This, of course, is a fairly mundane and harmless 
example of social dys-appearance. But there are also insidious experiences of social dys-
appearance, such as the experience of being a visible minority in a racist society or being 
visibly disabled in an ableist society. 
 Leder’s characterization of bodily dys-appearance helps us better understand the 
dynamics between the lived and corporeal body. But his emphasis on negative experiences of 
bodily objectification may also be misleading. Kristin Zeiler argues that the 
phenomenological tradition over-emphasizes negative bodily experiences, implying that the 
only good way of experiencing the body is as absent or transparent (Zeiler, 2010)3. If this 
were the case, then we’d always want to avoid experiencing our body as an object. But this is 
obviously untrue (see also Legrand, 2007). Zeiler gives the example of a woman swimming 
on a summer day, feeling the warmth of the water against her skin and the strength of her 
arms. She might not reflect on her body in this instance—but she could. And, if she does 
 
2 See (Dolezal, 2015) for an excellent account of experiences of bodily shame, including in health care. 
3 Zeiler coins the term “eu-appearance,” drawing on the Greek eu to refer to bodily experiences that are “well, 
easy or good” (Zeiler, 2010, p. 338), which she directly contrasts with Leder’s “dys-appearance.” 
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reflect on her body, she may have an experience of her body as “well, easy or good” despite 
it becoming the explicit or thematic object of her experience (Zeiler, 2010, p. 338). Zeiler 
also describes the positive bodily experiences that some women have while pregnant. And we 
may also consider cases in which one enjoys being overtly sexualized by one’s partner, 
experiencing oneself as an object of sexual desire. But there are plenty of mundane examples 
as well, such as admiring one’s new outfit in the mirror or showing one’s tattoo to a friend. 
These are all cases wherein the body is the explicit object of experience in a positive or 
enjoyable way. Now that we have an understanding of the general dynamics of bodily 
experience, we can consider how this way of thinking about the body can help us understand 
experiences in illness and health care. 
2 Philosophical Approaches to Applied Phenomenology 
The phenomenological concept of embodiment, including the distinction between the lived 
and corporeal body, has been applied, to some extent, in qualitative research and clinical 
practice. However, in most cases, qualitative researchers and clinicians don’t draw their 
concepts directly from the classical, philosophical texts. They often adapt concepts from the 
work of contemporary, philosophically trained phenomenologists who have already applied 
these concepts in their philosophical studies of illness. We can think of these philosophical 
applications as an intermediary step between purely theoretical phenomenology, on the one 
hand, and empirical applications in qualitative research and clinical practice, on the other. 
Because these philosophical applications provide conceptual formulations that are more 
readily applied in qualitative health research and clinical practice, it’s worthwhile to review 
some of this literature here. 
 Jenny Slatman and Gili Yaron have, for instance, used the phenomenological concept 
of embodiment to explore how people experience their own bodies when disfigured. They 
use the example of a nurse named Leah whose face was disfigured as the result of cancer 
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treatments. They stress that Leah’s disfigurement isn’t something that simply happens to her; 
she’s not a passive object. Rather, “in relating to her condition, she develops various ways of 
‘doing’ her body anew—ways that operate both on her body as image (an intentional object 
of Körper) and on her body as lived-through (a sensing self or Leib)” (Slatman & Yaron, 
2014, p. 231). Others, both friends and strangers, perceive Leah’s face in new ways, 
including as “strange, different, fascinating, or repulsive” (Slatman & Yaron, 2014, p. 231). 
But is this how everyone experiences the facial disfigurements of others? Not necessarily. 
Slatman and Yaron consider the example of Royal Air Force aircrew members in the United 
Kingdom who survived severe burns in the Second World War. In contrast with most people 
who suffer severe burns, “These men did not have to hide their damaged faces since they 
were signs of bravery; their faces expressed the honor of having served their country” 
(Slatman & Yaron, 2014, p. 288). The aircrew members and members of their community 
experienced the facial scars in a way that differs substantially from the experience of 
someone who was burned in an accident. What should we take away from the contrasting 
examples of Leah, whose face was disfigured by cancer treatment, and the aircrew members, 
whose faces were disfigured after surviving severe burns in war? Disfigurement is never 
merely disfigurement. Any bodily feature, especially one that strays from the norm, will 
always be imbued with a particular meaning within the context of one’s life and social 
situation.  
 Carel provides another philosophical analysis of embodiment in illness, which helps 
us flesh out the dynamics between bodily absence and bodily appearance. She argues that in 
severe or chronic illness, one typically undergoes an experience of bodily doubt. The healthy, 
able-bodied person typically operates with a sense of bodily certainty. This is the sense that 
my body will carry on functioning in the way it’s always functioned: my legs will climb the 
stairs, my fingers will type, my stomach will digest, my lungs will breathe. This certainty is 
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not, however, an explicit belief that my body will keep functioning. If someone were to ask 
me if I thought my legs would always be able to carry me up the stairs, I’d readily admit that, 
one day, when I’m much older, my legs will fail me and I won’t be able to climb stairs on my 
own. But this belief isn’t a genuine feeling of doubt. As soon as I’ve expressed this fact about 
my future, I can put it out of my mind and go back to my everyday routine. So, what does 
Carel mean by bodily doubt and bodily certainty? The kind of certainty that’s lost isn’t so 
much a belief as a kind of faith. When you have a chronic illness, you realize that you simply 
had an unquestioned faith in your bodily functioning. After you’ve witnessed your own body 
fail you, this faith can no longer remain unquestioned. The possibility of bodily dysfunction 
now permeates how you find yourself situated in the world, and this fundamentally alters 
how you experience and relate to your own body (Carel, 2013). Your body—or at least some 
part of your body—can never fully recede from awareness. Carel argues that bodily doubt has 
three key components, one of which is a loss of bodily transparency. Where the body was 
previously absent or transparent, it now “becomes explicitly thematized as a problem. The 
tacit taken for granted attitude we have towards it (we expect our bodies to perform complex 
actions, to be pain-free, to allow us to concentrate, and so on) is replaced by an explicit 
attitude of concern, anxiety, and fear” (Carel, 2013, p. 191). 
Moreover, this shift in bodily experience never occurs in isolation. It’s always 
accompanied by a corresponding shift in how one experiences one’s environment. S. Kay 
Toombs provides an illuminating example of how she experienced changes in her 
environment while living with chronic progressive multiple sclerosis. She says, “The 
bookcase outside my bedroom was once intended by my body as ‘a repository for books,’ 
then as ‘that which is to be grasped for support on the way to the bathroom,’ and is now 
intended as ‘an obstacle to get around with my wheelchair’” (Toombs, 1995, p. 16). In this 
example, we see how the very same object initially shifts between two kinds of affordance—
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something to put books on, then something to grasp for support. But, once Toombs navigates 
her home in a wheelchair, the bookcase becomes an object of frustration—an obstacle to be 
avoided. Of course, the physical bookcase itself didn’t change. What changed was the 
relation between Toombs’ own motor capacities and the objects available to her, which 
reshaped the sense and meaning of her environment.  
 In examples like this one, we gain a better understanding of the personal or individual 
experience of illness and disability. But some phenomenologists have also studied how the ill 
or disabled body is experienced in the clinical encounter.4 Toombs goes so far as to argue that 
the patient and clinician occupy different worlds: “Within the context of the universe of 
science, illness is rendered thematic in terms of ‘objective’, quantifiable data. Disease is thus 
reified as a distinct entity residing in, but in some way separated from, the one who is ill. The 
patient, however, encounters illness in its immediacy in the context of the world of everyday 
life, as opposed to the universe of science” (Toombs, 1987, p. 228). Toombs argues that the 
clinician may fail to address the issues of most concern to the patient because they don’t 
appreciate the lived reality of illness. 
 Leder makes a similar point when he says that the patient presents his lived body for 
treatment, but the doctor, by contrast, attends to the patient’s corporeal or object body (Leder, 
1984, p. 32). He says, “…the doctor examines a physical body. Much of her/his medical 
training has de-emphasized lived embodiment from the first ‘patient’ encounter – that with a 
cadaver. The predominant task at hand is to search for a mechanical precipitant of disease, be 
it toxin, trauma, or bug” (Leder, 1984, p. 33). However, Leder also acknowledges that this 
dualistic view is often too superficial. It’s too simple to say that the patient experiences her 
own body only as lived—as sensing and experiencing—whereas the doctor experiences the 
 
4 Experiences of clinical interaction have, however, been relatively neglected by philosophically trained 
phenomenologists. This is an area that would benefit from increased attention from phenomenologists, including 
both philosophers and qualitative researchers. 
 14 
patient’s body only as a physical thing. In some cases, “The patient as well may have come to 
regard his/her body in an objectified mode. This process is often begun by the illness itself” 
(Leder, 1984, p. 33). 
 These philosophical analyses illuminate embodied experiences that are characteristic 
of illness and healthcare interactions. In this respect, they’re more concrete or particular than 
what we find in purely theoretical accounts of embodiment, which articulate features of 
experience that hold for any experiencing subject. But they’re also less concrete or particular 
than what we find in empirical qualitative research. While the philosophical applications 
described above do appeal to personal experiences of illness, they don’t illuminate the 
experience of an individual or of a particular patient population. Rather, they use concrete 
examples to reflect upon and describe the characteristic (or even essential) features of severe 
or chronic illness in general. They therefore represent only the first stage of 
phenomenological application. 
3 Embodiment in Qualitative Health Research 
The next stage of application is empirical qualitative research. While phenomenology was 
originally a strictly philosophical field, it has been adapted for qualitative research in 
psychology, pedagogy, and health care, among other fields (see, e.g., K. Dahlberg, H. 
Dahlberg, & Nystrom, 2008; Giorgi, 2009; van Manen, 1990). Traditionally, these 
approaches adapted phenomenology’s philosophical methods for use in empirical research. 
The Husserlian epoché, for example, is often presented as a technique for bracketing out or 
suspending one’s prejudices, allowing the researcher so study phenomena in an unbiased 
manner. However, as Zahavi has argued, many of these adaptations are founded in inaccurate 
interpretations of the phenomenological method (Zahavi, forthcoming). For this reason, he 
suggests that qualitative researchers instead draw on phenomenology’s theoretical and 
conceptual foundations, rather than its methods (Zahavi, 2020). 
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 A few researchers have used phenomenological concepts in their qualitative studies 
and have also provided preliminary reflections on how they incorporate these concepts 
(Fernandez & Køster, 2019; Klinke, Thorsteinsson, & Jónsdóttir, 2014; Slatman, 2014). 
Before other researchers can successfully employ conceptual approaches, these techniques 
will need to be articulated in considerably greater detail. However, for the purposes of this 
article, I provide an example of one such study, conducted by Slatman along with her 
collaborators Annemie Halsema and Agnes Meershoek, which uses the dynamics of the lived 
and corporeal body to understand how women experience and respond to their scars 
following breast cancer surgery. 5 
Slatman, Halsema, and Meershoek (2016) highlight how their attention to the 
phenomenological concept of embodiment makes their qualitative approach distinctive:  
…our approach […] slightly differs from the majority of phenomenological studies on 
breast cancer treatment, because the emphasis in these studies is often put on the 
question of how women endow meaning to their lives and life-world while living 
through disease and physical changes. Our analysis, by contrast, focuses on the 
various ways in which women endow meaning to their changed bodies. We thus 
apply the phenomenological question of giving meaning (Sinngebung) specifically to 
the appearance of one’s own body. (Slatman et al., 2016, p. 1615) 
Rather than take a broad phenomenological orientation toward one’s life and lived world, 
Slatman, Halsema, and Meershoek focused specifically on bodily experience, drawing 
especially on their understanding of the dynamics between the lived and corporeal body. 
They conducted in-depth interviews with 19 female breast cancer patients. The aim of this 
study was to understand how women respond to scars after breast surgery. Moreover, the 
 
5 The study uses Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) and supplements this methodology with 
concepts from philosophical phenomenology. However, in principle, phenomenological concepts can be 
integrated with a variety of qualitative methodologies—not just those that claim roots in phenomenology. 
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interviews were spaced out over four to six months to study how women’s experience of their 
scars changed over time. By using phenomenological concepts to focus on these aspects of 
bodily experience, the interviews produced nuanced descriptions of how women experienced 
their scars. 
In one example, they describe how, immediately after surgery, some women 
experience their own body as a biomedical object. One participant reported, “When I look in 
the mirror, I think: ‘Ah, this has been done nicely’ (…) Yes, it is tight, really very tight: very 
beautiful” (Slatman et al., 2016, p. 1618). As they point out, the woman’s reference to beauty 
isn’t a traditional aesthetic one. She doesn’t claim that her scar is attractive or makes her 
more beautiful. Rather, she admires the aesthetics of the surgical skill involved. As they say, 
“While viewing her body in this way, by adopting a clinical eye, this woman perceived her 
body in a distant manner. By means of this distancing stance, she perceived her body as an 
object, assessing whether it has been repaired in either a satisfactory or unsatisfactory way” 
(Slatman et al., 2016, p. 1618). 
By conducting their qualitative study within a phenomenological conceptual 
framework, Slatman, Halsema, and Meershoek obtain empirical descriptions of experience 
that can be brought into dialogue with philosophical studies. For example, their descriptions 
provide empirical evidence in support of Zeiler’s argument that one may experience one’s 
objectified body in a positive light. And they also highlight the communal or intersubjective 
nature of these experiences by demonstrating how the biomedical perspective of the clinician 
can be adopted by the patient. This exemplifies how qualitative studies that draw on 
phenomenological concepts can flesh out the details of philosophical accounts that may 
otherwise remain hypothetical or abstract.  
We find additional examples of the potential for this kind of interdisciplinary 
engagement throughout their article. As they point out, women experienced their scars in a 
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variety of ways after they had healed. One woman reported experiences akin to how Leder 
describes the transition from bodily dys-appearance to bodily dis-appearance: 
Well yes, in the beginning, I was constantly looking, and I saw the empty place, the 
big scar, and that was really strange. It really looked weird: on the one side I have a 
breast and on the other side there is nothing. But if I look at it now, I just see a body (. 
. .). I do no longer mention it. I mean, I do not specifically notice, that the breast is no 
longer there. (Slatman et al., 2016, p. 1618) 
As she explains, immediately after the surgery her scar was a near-constant object of 
awareness and concern. Yet, as she habituated to this new bodily appearance, the missing 
breast and the scar itself no longer held her attention. Her body faded into the background of 
her experience in much the same way that it had before the surgery. 
Another woman, however, said that whether or not she wears her prosthesis depends 
on her interactions with others. When at home, she prefers not to wear the prosthesis. But she 
puts it on if she’ll have visitors—not because the alterations in her appearance bother her, but 
because she’s concerned that it might bother them. Here, we see that same outward behavior 
(e.g., wearing a prosthesis in public) may stem from different ways of experiencing or 
relating to one’s own body. This example may also complicate Leder’s notion of social dys-
appearance, since the woman in question recognizes that her body shows up to others in a 
negative or disturbing way, even as she remains largely unphased by this aspect of her 
appearance. 
 These phenomenologically informed qualitative studies provide insight into the 
experiences of particular populations. But they can also expand and revise our philosophical 
understandings of embodied experience (Zahavi, 2020; Zahavi & Martiny, 2019). Shaun 
Gallagher refers to this back and forth between philosophy and empirical science as “mutual 
enlightenment” (Gallagher, 1997; see also Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012). However, whereas the 
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nature of mutual enlightenment between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences has been 
well-articulated, we need further methodological reflections on how philosophical 
phenomenology and qualitative phenomenology may reciprocally enlighten each other 
(Gallagher, 2012). Such methodological work will enhance the value of interdisciplinary 
collaboration between philosophers and qualitative researchers. But, if we look beyond 
research, there’s a further challenge that we have not yet considered: How do we integrate 
phenomenology and clinical practice? 
4 Embodiment in Clinical Practice 
So far, we’ve examined a purely theoretical account of human embodiment, its philosophical 
applications to the study of illness, and its empirical applications in qualitative health 
research. But some scholars have also suggested that phenomenological understandings of 
embodiment in illness and healthcare interactions can be applied directly in clinical practice. 
Helena Dahlberg argues that phenomenology can enhance person-centered care by opening 
up a space for articulating the patient’s lived experience: “Not least is the understanding of 
health and illness as ‘lived’ important if we want to promote a person‐centred care and thus 
engage the person as an active partner in her/his care and treatment. If the patient is to be able 
to partake in discussions and decisions about her/his own care, her/his embodied experience 
first of all has to be recognized, valued and endorsed” (H. Dahlberg, 2019). Slatman and 
Yaron also suggest “that medical practices could be improved if medical professionals could 
incorporate a wide range of questions about embodied self-experiences in their patient 
interviews, and if they subsequently could use patients’ ‘body-stories’ while counseling 
them” (Slatman & Yaron, 2014, p. 236). And Marianne Klinke, Björn Thorsteinsson, and 
Helga Jónsdóttir argue that phenomenological concepts of embodiment can help clinicians 
and patients better understand embodied experiences that are otherwise difficult to articulate, 
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such as the experience of hemi-spatial neglect following a stroke (Klinke et al., 2014, see also 
Klinke, Zahavi, Hjaltason, Thorsteinsson, & Jónsdóttir 2015). 
Calls for clinical applications of phenomenology are not difficult to find. But these 
calls rarely include any directives for how, exactly, one should convey these 
phenomenological insights to clinicians or patients. Carel’s proposal for a phenomenological 
workshop is a notable exception. Her workshop model is flexible and can be adapted to the 
needs and interests of participants, engaging them through films, books, images, or music in 
conjunction with small group discussions and creative activities (Carel, 2012, p. 109). 
However, her proposal does include a general framework, which guides participants through 
three methodological stages: “the phenomenological reduction, thematizing illness, and 
reviewing one’s being in the world” (Carel, 2012, p. 107). In the first step, the reduction (or 
bracketing) is used to distance oneself from taken for granted ways of experiencing and 
understanding the world, especially traditional ways of understanding disease. This allows 
participants to better reflect on their lived experience of illness (Carel, 2012, p. 107). In the 
second step, participants thematize their illness, which means that they focus attention on 
some particular aspect of experience and attend to this aspect of experience in a particular 
way. Carel explains, for instance, that a patient and clinician may thematize the same illness 
in two different ways: “A patient may thematize her illness as a central feature of her life, 
attending to her symptoms as pervasive, while the physician may thematize the illness as a 
‘case of cancer,’ attending to symptoms as diagnostic clues” (Carel, 2012, p. 108). In the 
third step, participants examine how their illness has altered their being in the world—that is, 
how they find themselves in the midst of their lived, meaningful environment. As she says, 
“The toolkit uses being in the world to capture the pervasive effects illness may have on 
one’s sense of place, on one’s interactions with the environment and with other people, on 
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meanings and norms, and on the nexus of entities, habits, knowledge, and other people that 
makes up one’s world” (Carel, 2012, p. 109). 
Carel’s workshop model parallel’s traditional qualitative approaches to applied 
phenomenology, which also adapt phenomenological methods, such as the reduction and 
thematization, to orient the researcher toward the lived world. However, it’s also possible to 
develop a workshop model that uses the approach I’ve outlined in this article. This workshop 
model is organized by a single phenomenological concept, rather than by methodological 
stages. I have piloted this model at workshops for nurses, physicians, rehabilitation therapists, 
and hospital administrators, focusing on embodiment and experiences of bodily 
objectification. However, the model can, in principle, be used with any core existential 
structure, such as selfhood, affectivity, or temporality. In this outline, I provide my personal 
reflections on these workshops. I do not draw on participant feedback; but I may address this 
in future work. After briefly sketching this model, I identify some of the distinctive features 
of this approach. 
How does one organize a phenomenological workshop based on concepts rather than 
methods? It’s best not to jump straight into a discussion of philosophical concepts, since the 
participants may have no background in philosophy. Rather, the workshop leader should start 
by presenting a series of questions or prompts that will be of immediate interest to clinicians. 
For example, drawing on Slatman’s work, one might ask, “How do people respond to scars 
after undergoing surgery?” Or, drawing on Toombs’ work, one might ask, “How does the 
meaning of one’s environment alter after losing mobility?” These kinds of questions 
immediately gear into the day to day lives of both patients and clinicians, and they give 
participants an initial sense of the kinds of questions they’ll be reflecting on throughout the 
workshop. 
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It may not be immediately clear to the participants how to answer these questions, or 
even what would count as a good answer. But, at this point, the workshop leader and 
participants have established some common ground. And this is the stage at which the 
workshop leader can introduce the phenomenological concept that will allow the participants 
to appreciate and attempt to answer these questions. To provide this foundation, the 
workshop leader should introduce the concept of embodiment, including the distinction 
between the lived and corporeal body (along the lines of what I’ve provided in Section 1). 
However, throughout the workshop, there should be a back and forth between abstract 
concepts, on the one hand, and concrete or personal experiences, on the other. Rather than 
present the concept through a pure lecture, it’s best to incorporate time for the participants to 
fill out the fairly abstract concepts with their own experiences. For instance, after describing 
the dynamics between the lived and corporeal body, the workshop leader might briefly 
describe how bodily disfigurement is always interpreted in a particular way, then ask 
participants to reflect on cases in which they have coped with some form of bodily 
disfigurement. Depending on the size of the group, it can be helpful to give participants time 
to discuss their experiences in smaller groups before asking for a few representatives to share 
their experiences with everyone. 
These discussions achieve a few key aims: First, by discussing personal experiences 
within the scope of a phenomenological concept, participants will begin to solidify their 
understanding of the concept through their attempted applications. Second, the variety of 
shared examples help the participants appreciate just how widely applicable these concepts 
are; they’ll quickly see how the concept can enhance their understanding of a range of 
experiences by facilitating careful and considered reflection. Third, they allow the workshop 
leader to gauge the participants’ understanding of the material and, in some cases, modify 
specific examples that the participants have offered in a way that better illustrates the concept 
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under discussion. And, fourth, the participants’ examples can also allow the workshop leader 
to guide a participant through the process of reflecting more carefully on their experience, 
perhaps describing it in greater detail or adding additional nuance; for instance, if a 
participant points out that, when she was younger, she would find ways to cover a scar on her 
arm that she was ashamed of, the workshop leader may ask her to describe how she 
experiences her scar now, how the meaning of her scar changed over time, and which life 
events or personal experiences played a role in reshaping the meaning of her scar. 
After participants have gained an initial understanding of the phenomenological 
concepts and how to apply them, they should be given the opportunity to apply these 
concepts in guided breakout sessions. In my own workshops, I’ve used the following prompts 
to structure these breakout sessions: 
(1) Think of a time when you experienced your own body as an object. Was there a 
specific event that triggered this experience? Was the experience affectively charged 
(e.g., did it involve feelings of shame, pride, embarrassment, etc.)? Using some of the 
concepts introduced in the presentation, try to describe this experience in detail. 
 
(2) If you have provided health care for patients/clients, try to identify two cases in 
which your patients experienced their own body as an object. One case should be a 
harmful experience of objectification and one should be a beneficial experience of 
objectification. How did the situation differ between these two cases? What 
contributed to the experience being beneficial/harmful? Do you think you played a 
role in how your patient experienced their own body? If so, how? 
 
(3) Drawing on some of the concepts introduced in the presentation, try to formulate 
a few phenomenologically inspired questions that you might ask patients. These 
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questions should help you and the patient better understand their bodily experience of 
illness or how their healthcare treatment shapes their bodily experience. 
 
By providing this kind of conceptual background and inviting participants to share their own 
experiences, it’s also important to remind participants that the aim of the workshop is not to 
provide definitive answers to these questions. Rather, the aim is to provide the background 
that one needs to ask these kinds of questions in a clinical setting and have informed, 
enlightening conversations about these aspects of experience with their patients. 
In one respect, this approach gets participants to the same endpoint that Carel’s 
approach does. It allows participants to reflect upon, describe, and develop new 
understandings of how they find themselves in a lived, meaningful world. But the explicit 
conceptual framing may also provide a more focused structure for the workshop discussions. 
The participants may have, or treat, a wide variety of conditions, so the content of their 
examples will remain diverse. Yet, by focusing on one aspect of experience, such as 
embodiment, they have a shared framework to build upon and can help each other develop 
more nuanced understandings of illness experiences. Moreover, within this model, highly 
specialized workshops may be designed for clinicians or patients with a specific set of 
concerns, such as those who treat or undergo a specific medical intervention. One might, for 
instance, develop a workshop that focuses specifically on embodied experience during breast 
cancer treatment and recovery. Such a workshop could draw not only on the philosophical 
concept of embodiment, but also on phenomenologically informed qualitative research, 
providing illustrative examples of how women experience their own bodies in this situation. 
However, the workshop should still leave space for alternative ways of understanding and 
experiencing one’s own body in these circumstances, since qualitative studies may be 
representative of only a subset of experiences. 
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An openness to participants’ own experiences has been key to the workshop’s 
success. It’s all too easy for the workshop leader to keep the discussion focused on a concrete 
example that they’ve provided, since they’re comfortable discussing and analyzing this 
example from a variety of perspectives. I’ve found, however, that the workshops are most 
valuable when participants are given ample opportunity to apply phenomenological concepts 
to their own experiences. Each group of participants come to the table with their own 
personal histories and expertise, and should be given the opportunity to explore how 
phenomenology can help them tackle their unique professional challenges. In some cases, 
what participants take away from the workshop may not be what the workshop leader 
originally intended to convey. But the workshop should be considered successful so long as 
participants achieve an accurate understanding of the general concept and, equipped with this 
understanding, are able to reflect upon and appreciate experiences of illness, health care, and 
recovery in new and illuminating ways. 
Conclusion and Relevance to Clinical Practice 
This brings us back to the most important questions: What is the purpose of a conceptual 
workshop? What kind of positive impact can it have on clinical practice? Phenomenology’s 
conceptual distinctions open up a space for reflecting on experience in a nuanced way. They 
orient us toward aspects of experience that we typically don’t reflect upon, and thereby 
provide new opportunities for patients to understand and describe their experiences of illness 
and health care. Clinicians, equipped with a phenomenological understanding of experience, 
may also be in a better position to empathize with their patients and, thus, engage with them 
in more meaningful ways (Fernandez & Zahavi, forthcoming). They may, for instance, be 
able to describe some of the bodily experiences that their patient might undergo as their 
illness progresses. Or they may be able to formulate questions that help them better 
understand how their patient is recovering after a procedure. Even when we consider 
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approaches to medicine with limited in-person interaction, such as telehealth, a 
phenomenological understanding of embodiment may help us better characterize what, 
exactly, is lost or modified in these modes of interaction. 
Phenomenology, whether applied in philosophy, qualitative health research, or 
clinical practice, can help us understand the experience of being ill and receiving healthcare 
treatment. However, there is disagreement over how to properly apply phenomenological 
insights, especially outside of philosophy. In this article, I’ve argued for an approach that 
epxloits phenomenology’s well-developed concepts and conceptual distinctions. Embodiment 
provides a prime example of just how illuminating a conceptual approach to applied 
phenomenology can be. But this same model can be applied across a variety of concepts, 
allowing us to explore the temporal, spatial, and affective aspects of illness, as well as 
alterations in one’s sense of self and relations to others. To obtain a complete picture of any 
particular way of being in the world, we will, of course, need to examine it through all of 
these concepts. However, by focusing on each aspect of experience individually, researchers, 
clinicians, and patients will have the opportunity to explore specific aspects of illness and 
health care with depth and nuance, helping them make sense of things in ways that they 
weren’t able to before. 
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